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In this performance evaluation study, two questions are addressed.  First, do active 
fund managers possess macro and micro forecasting skills that deliver superior risk-
adjusted returns?  Second, what is the nature of market timing/stock selectivity trade 
off in the generation of alpha?  The answers from this study are as follows: as an 
industry, managers delivered inferior returns for superannuation investors for the 
period 1991 through 1999.  The study provides little evidence that the Australian 
funds management industry holds sufficient macro and/or micro forecasting abilities 
to generate positive alpha.  While previous research has found that inferior market 
timing decisions are compensated for by superior stock selection skills, this study 
finds no substantive inverse relationship between timing and selectivity. 
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The economic function of pension funds is to facilitate the transformation of 
retirement savings into retirement income.  The efficiency with which fund managers 
execute this transformative function has received much attention from both academics 
and practitioners alike.  The financial economics literature suggests that the 
performance of actively managed funds, on average, has been inferior to that of a 
passively managed alternative
1.  This has led researchers, such as Gruber (1996), to 
ask “why do investors buy actively managed mutual funds (pp. 783)?”  This paper 
begins to address this question by examining the role of market timing and stock 
selectivity in the generation of alpha (a)
2. 
                                                            
* Corresponding author: Email: m.veeraraghavan@mailbox.gu.edu.au; Tel: +61-7-5552-8898. 
We thank Ralf Becker, Stan Hurn, Tony Makin, and Jon Stanford for helpful comments and 
participants at the 2001 ‘Future of Superannuation’ Symposium, hosted by the School of Economics 
and Finance, Queensland University of Technology and the Economic Society of Australia (Qld) Inc. 
1 See, for example, Gruber (1996), Sawicki and Ong (2000) and Wermers (2000). 
2 Following Warwick (2000), an investment manager is said to generate alpha (a) under the following 
circumstances: alpha is generated if investment returns exceed an appropriate benchmark, if the risk      
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In order for active managers to generate alpha, financial markets (at least in the short-
run) must be predictable.  Two possible methods used by managers to create value for 
investors are: superior market timing abilities (macro-forecasting); and/or, superior 
stock selection (micro-forecasting).  If managers could time the market, Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) argued that they would hold a larger share of volatile (less volatile) 
securities in a bull (bear) market.  Moreover, the documentation of anomalies relating 
to the size (Banz 1981) and value (Rosenberg, Reid and Lanstein 1985) premium may 
provide an opportunity for active managers to garner superior risk-adjusted returns 
from micro forecasting. 
 
The breakdown of manager performance into macro and micro-forecasting decisions, 
formalised by Fama (1972), and the role of anomalies in the pricing of risk (Fama and 
French 1996) has two important implications for the evaluation of manager 
performance.  First, studies that fail to consider timing and selectivity simultaneously 
could lead to erroneous conclusions being made about the sources of alpha 
generation
3.  Second, multiple factors (apart from the overall market factor) such as 
firm size and the ratio of book-equity to market-equity are required to explain the 
cross-section of returns in an economically meaningful manner. 
 
The pioneering contribution of Treynor and Mazuy (TM) (1966) assumed that 
portfolio returns would be a non-linear function of market returns.  The TM quadratic-
regression model permitted researchers to investigate the behaviour of systematic risk 
decisions made by managers.  A second parametric test of selectivity and timing, 
developed by Henriksson and Merton (HM) (1981), used a different interpretation of 
market timing ability.  In the spirit of TM, funds may alter portfolio composition 
subject to market movements, but HM also incorporated the idea that managers can 
elect the level of market risk.  The up and down-market beta model of HM provides a 
useful confirmatory measure to test timing performance
4. 
 
International evidence reports that an inverse relationship exists between market 
timing and stock selection.  Fund managers typically have negative or ‘perverse’ 
market timing skills when evaluated by the TM and HM models.  However, the poor 
market timing decisions of managers appear to be somewhat offset by superior stock 
selection skill.  This negative relationship has been consistently demonstrated in US 
(Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman 1993 and Bollen and Busse 2001), UK (Fletcher 1995) 
and international (Cumby and Glen 1990) mutual and pension fund returns. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
taken to achieve the return is similar to that of the benchmark; or, alpha is generated if managers’ 
returns are equivalent to an appropriate benchmark, if the risk taken to achieve the return is less than 
that of the benchmark. 
3 Chen and Stockum (1986) note that the use of the traditional Sharpe-Linter-Mossin (SLM) model is 
likely to generate biased results as it treats the systematic risk level of a fund as a fixed coefficient 
rather than as a decision variable.  The nonstationarity of a fund’s systematic risk violates the basic 
assumption of an OLS regression model.  Grant (1977) contends that this will result in a downwardly 
biased alpha coefficient. Treynor (1966) also argues that such measures do not capture the share of 
fund variability due to a lack of diversification, resulting in the possibility that managers could improve 
their ratings without improving the quality of their skills via security selection by giving up more 
diversification benefits. 
4 Dybvig and Ross (1985) argue that the HM model only tests if the fund manager had access to special 
information.  Moreover, the HM model is not as sophisticated as the model of Jensen (1968) as it does 
not forecast the magnitude of the superior performance, only the direction of the performance.      
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However, for the Australian setting, the relationship between market timing and stock 
selectivity skills is less clear.  The preliminary findings of Sinclair (1990) using a 
sample of 16 pooled superannuation funds over the period 1981 through 1987 found 
that 5 out of the 16 funds exhibited significant risk level changes, consistent with the 
proposition that managers were attempting to time the market.  Moreover, all funds 
showed significant negative market timing ability and significant positive security 
selection ability, with timing dominating overall performance. 
 
The small sample size investigated by Sinclair (1990) and use of a five year sample 
period (which included the 1987 stock market crash) motivated Hallahan and Faff 
(1999) to undertake a detailed investigation of the timing and selectivity skills of 65 
Australian equity trusts
5.  Hallahan and Faff (1999) selected a post-crash observation 
period from 1988 through 1997 using the TM and HM models
6.  Unlike previous 
research, the contribution of Hallahan and Faff (1999) provided two interesting 
results: first, some evidence of positive timing coefficients were evident; and, second, 
negative selectivity coefficients (although not always significant) were obtained by 
managers.  While there remained a negative correlation between the timing and 
selectivity variables, Hallahan and Faff (1999) found that where there was evidence of 
market timing ability, this was being offset by poor stock selection ability. 
 
Sawicki and Ong (2000) undertook a third major study considering the behaviour of 
marketing timing and stock selectivity in Australia.  Using Ferson and Schadt’s 
(1996) lagged information framework, the study examined the performance of 97 
domestic managed funds over the period 1983 through 1995.  Sawicki and Ong 
(2000) reported that conditional alphas were higher and positive (with the number of 
significant negative market timing coefficients greatly reduced) under conditioned 
information.  At first glance, the results appeared to provide support to the status quo 
of negative market timing and positive selectivity.  However, Sawicki and Ong (2000) 
noted that the improvement in performance using the conditional model was counter-
intuitive.  The negative covariance found between fund beta and market return 
(resulting in improved performance) should have been controlled for by the 
conditioning information.  However, a negative correlation would imply fund 
managers reduced their exposure to market movements when market returns were 
high and vice versa.  Ferson and Warther (1996) suggest that the negative correlation 
may be partly the result of mutual fund cash flows. 
 
International evidence suggests that active fund managers face a trade-off between 
timing and selectivity in the generation of alpha.  Specifically, this inverse 
relationship has predominantly taken the form of negative timing decisions being 
somewhat compensated for by positive selectivity skills.  However, the Australian 
setting provides an interesting case study, with Hallahan and Faff (1999) reporting 
contrary findings.  The controversy surrounding the relationship between timing and 
selectivity in Australia has important implications for the performance of Australian 
equity superannuation funds.  Superannuation is currently the second most important 
asset for Australians (after the home), with assets totalling AUD 495.3 billion in 2001 
(APRA 2001).  The retail funds management industry, the focus of this study, 
                                                            
5 The sample investigated by Hallahan and Faff (1999) included diversified growth trusts (37), 
diversified income equity trusts (8), property equity trusts (9), diversified resources equity trusts (6), 
and other equity trusts (5). 
6 Hallahan and Faff (1999) also employed the specification tests of Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986).      
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managed a total of AUD 205 billion of these assets as at the end of fiscal 2000 
(APRA 2001). 
 
The primary concern for the fund manager is to maximise returns for their 
constituents, in this case, the superannuation fund member.  In generating returns on 
retirement savings, it is important to ascertain the role of market timing and stock 
selectivity.  Moreover, given the controversy surrounding the nature of the trade-off 
between timing and selectivity (and the issue of sample period selection) it is timely 
to undertake a further investigation of the Australian setting.  The rest of the paper is 
organised as follows.  Section I outlines the performance evaluation models and tests 
of timing and selectivity used in the study.  Section II describes the data.  Section III 
presents the empirical analysis, with Section IV providing concluding remarks. 
 
I.  Tests of Timing, Selectivity and Performance 
 
Fund manager skill is evaluated through an analysis of the alpha generated over a 
given period.  This study is concerned initially with manager skill against benchmark 
performance and, primarily, with the ability for active managers to forecast market 
movements and to select undervalued stocks to create value for superannuation 
investors.  In achieving the research objective, the analysis commences with the 
excess return from a single index model. 
 




ai  =  risk adjusted abnormal return from the single index model; 
Rft  =  return on the Reserve Bank of Australia 13 week T-note in month t; 
Rmt  =  return on the Australian Stock Exchange Top 100 accumulation index 
    in month t; 
bi     =  factor sensitivity of difference in return on fund  i to portfolio  j ( j 
representing the market factor); and, 
ui   =  random error term. 
 
Jensen’s (1968) single index model, posits that the security’s return should be linearly 
related to its risk, as measured by beta.  The intercept term detects whether managers 
have superior forecasting abilities, with alpha generated by selecting securities 
resulting i n  ei > 0
7.  As Equation (1) is a single-period model, estimating the 
regression over time should allow investors to have heterogeneous investment 
horizons.  Furthermore, returns are assumed to be independently and identically 
distributed (IID) through time and jointly multi-variate normal. 
 
Recent advances in the asset pricing literature suggest that single index models are 
unable to capture the cross-section of expected stock returns, especially those 
anomalies relating to the size and value premium, in an economically meaningful 
                                                            
7 Alpha generation will be significantly positive if the fund manager has the ability to forecast future 
security prices.  Alpha will be zero if the manager mimics the composition of a reference benchmark.  
Finally, alpha will be significantly negative if the find manager performs worse than a naive strategy of 
random selection.      
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manner.  The selection of factors to be included in any multi index model has been a 
controversial subject in the evaluation literature.  Gruber (1996) suggests that the 
selection of factors should include indices that span the major types of securities held 
by funds, that failure to do so will “make performance estimates more a matter of how 
the excluded categories of stocks did than how well management could select 
securities (p.787).”  This study therefore employs a four-factor m odel, including 
factors relating to the market, size, style and bond indices of funds.  Again, it is 
assumed returns conditional on factor realisations are IID through time and jointly 
multi-variate normal. 
 




Rst – Rlt   =  the size effect captured by the difference in return between a small 
market capitalisation portfolio and a large market capitalisation 
portfolio based on Australian Stock Exchange Frank Russell Company 
indices in month t; 
Rgt – Rvt   =  the value premium effect captured by the difference in return between 
a growth portfolio and a value portfolio
8 based on the Australian Stock 
Exchange Frank Russell Company indices in month t; 
Rdt – Rft    =  the bond indices effect captured by the difference in return on a bond 
index representing the Commonwealth, semi-government and 
corporate bonds with all maturities; 
bki   =  factor sensitivity of difference in return on fund i to portfolio j (which 
represents the market, size, or value premium effect); and 
ei  =  random error term. 
 
As with the single index model, the manager’s ability to generate alpha is indicated by 
a significant positive result.  While general criticisms can be made of single and multi 
index models, one specific criticism is that both Equations (1) and (2) assume that a 
fund’s systematic risk is stationary over time.  The inability of such tests to 
incorporate dynamic risk strategies by managers may result in a regression estimate of 
ai that may be significantly biased downward (Grant 1977, and Lee and Rahman 
1990). 
 
TM (1966) addressed this concern with the development of a quadratic market model.  
Through the addition of a quadratic term to Equation (1), portfolio returns are a non-
linear function of the market return.  This provides a measure of the timing abilities of 
fund managers. 
 
i mt i mt i i it e R R R + + + =
2 g b a   (3) 
 
where 
gi  =  risk adjusted measure of market timing ability of fund i. 
 
There will be two hypotheses tested with this model:  
                                                            
8 This is the same as a portfolio of high book-to-market equity firms minus a portfolio of low book-to-
market portfolio equity firms.      
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Hypothesis I: 
H0:  ai  = 0 
Ha:  ai   „ 0 
 
Hypothesis II: 
H0:  gi = 0 
Ha:  gi „ 0 
 
Hypothesis I is concerned with testing for the presence of abnormal performance as 
mentioned in the models specified previously, but is measured net of the manager’s 
timing ability.  Hypothesis II is concerned with measuring the market timing ability of 
fund managers.  Market timing ability will be reflected by greater market exposure 
when the excess market returns are higher and vice versa.  A significantly positive 
value of gamma would indicate superior market timing ability.  If gamma does not 
deviate significantly from zero, the manager cannot outguess the market.  If gamma is 
significantly negative, there has been perverse market timing undertaken by the 
manager. 
 
HM (1981) took an alternative approach to the incorporation of timing ability into the 
traditional single index model.  They assumed managers could elect the level of 
market risk they wished to encounter, incorporating an up-market beta (b1i) and a 
down-market beta (b1i - b2i) in the analysis. 
 




ai  =  risk adjusted abnormal return from dual-beta model or the fund’s 
    selectivity ability; 
D   =  dummy variable that takes on a value of –1 for months when Rmt is 
    negative, and zero otherwise; and, 
b2i  =  risk adjusted measure of market timing ability of fund i. 
 
Like the TM’s quadratic market model, two hypotheses are tested with this model. 
 
Hypothesis III: 
H0:  ai   = 0 
Ha:  ai   „ 0 
 
Hypothesis IV: 
H0:  b2i   = b1i 
Ha:  b2i   „ b1i 
 
Again, Hypothesis III considers superior selectivity skills net of timing ability.  
Hypothesis IV is concerned with the market timing abilities of fund managers, 
determining whether a manager’s down-market beta is significantly different from the 
up-market beta. 
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A successful market timer will have a down-market beta greater than the up-market 
beta, (b1i - b2i) > b1i, therefore the resultant estimate for b2i is significantly positive.  If 
the estimate is significantly negative, ‘perverse’ market timing decisions have been 
undertaken.  If the manager’s actual b2i is not zero, deductions made from Jensen’s 
(1968) basic model may be rendered invalid.  Sinclair (1990) explains that alpha from 
a single index model would be overstated when b2i is greater than zero (a superior 
market timer) and understated when b2i is less than zero (an inferior market timer).  
 
Prior to describing the sample investigated in this study, two issues regarding the 
estimation technique undertaken in this study are noteworthy.  First, a correction for 
heteroskedasticity was necessary for both the TM and HM mdoels.  This is due to the 
error term demonstrating conditional heteroskedasticity as managers attempted to 
time market movements
9.  This occurs despite the assumption of security returns 
being independent and identically distributed through time.  To correct for this, Breen, 
Jagannathan and Ofer (1986), and Lehman and Modest (1987) suggest the use of 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors employed by White (1980), Hansen 
(1982), and Hsieh (1983).  All tests for significance in this study will be based on 
heteroskedasticity-adjusted t-statistics. 
 
Second, diagnostic tests (reported in Appendix I) reveal the problem of 
multicollinearity for both market timing models.  Collinearity of the regressors yields 
imprecise parameter estimates, weakening hypothesis testing.  Auxiliary regressions 
demonstrated that the squared excess market return variable and the excess market 
return variable with a dummy for the TM and HM models, respectively, is an 
approximate linear combination of the excess market return variable.  The output 
from auxiliary regressions is provided in Appendix II.  The F-statistics have p-values 
of zero under both market proxies used in this study and are less than the significance 
values of 5% and 10%.  Therefore the null hypothesis of no multicollinearity is 
rejected, with the variables mentioned being collinear with the other explanatory 
variable
10.  Therefore the empirical investigation has taken steps to correct for 
multicollinearity, as estimates without this correction will yield spurious results. 
 
Chapman and Pearson (2000) demonstrated that the problem of multicollinearity 
resulting from a model taking a non-linear functional form is resolved by the 
technique of orthogonalised polynomials
11.  This is achieved by transforming the 
squared excess market return variable and the excess market return variable with a 
dummy under both models, resulting in: 
 
                                                            
9 Previous studies have demonstrated that ignoring heteroskedasticity often leads to the rejection of the 
null hypothesis of no market timing ability too often when the null is in fact true, and vice versa.  
Although Henrickson (1981) found that adjusting for heteroskedastic terror terms did not alter their 
results, studies by Breen, Jagannathan, and Ofer (1986), and Lee and Rahman (1990) suggest the 
existence of non-homoskedastic residuals can significantly affect the power of tests for market timing.  
This is the result of OLS estimates being inefficient, as systematic risk is non-stationary. 
10 Appendix III shows that for the first market proxy, the ASX Top 100 Accumulation index, the 
squared excess market return variable and the excess market return variable with a dummy change 
from being significant variables when regressed against the excess fund return variable to insignificant 
variables when regressed with all explanatory variables.  This is usually seen to be evidence of 
multicollinearity.  Although the confirmatory proxy, the ASX Top 20 Accumulation index still shows 
some significant results, its significance has been reduced dramatically. 
11 See Draper and Smith (1998) for a detailed discussion of orthogonalised polynomials.      
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The transformed TM model: 
 
i mt i i mt i i it e R p R R + + + = ) ( g b a   [5] 
 
With the transformed HM model taking the form: 
 
i mt i i mt i i it e R p R R + + + = ) ( 2 1 b b a   [6] 
 
The new regressor, pi (Rmt), is formed as the regression residual of Rmt
2 and DRmt 
(under separate equations) onto a constant.  This is then scaled to have a standard 
deviation equal to the standard deviation of the dependent variable,  Rit.  These 
orthogonalised and scaled monomials have the incremental effect of adding the 
original terms in Equations (3) and (4).  The parameter estimates from Equations (5) 
and (6) will be reported throughout the study. 
 
II.  Data 
 
Morningstar Research Pty Ltd provided return data on retail ‘Superannuation Funds 
Australian Equity – General’ for the period January 1991 through April 1999, a total 
of 100 observations.  Fund returns were net of management expenses but excluded 
entry and exit loads.  To minimise the problem of survivorship bias, all funds in 
existence over the observation period were initially considered, including all 
terminated funds.  The only exclusion from the sample were funds that did not have at 
least 30 months of data available. The population consisted of 142 funds, with 8 funds 
being excluded as the result of n ‡ 30, resulting in a sample of 136 funds. 
 
The funds are separated into three categories by Morningstar: open-end; closed-end; 
and, non-surviving or terminated funds.  Open-end funds, commonly referred to as 
unit trusts, may issue or redeem additional units of the fund at net asset value.  The 
retail funds considered in this study require a minimum initial investment of AUD 
2,000 with minimum contributions of AUD 100.  A total of 68 open-end funds are 
examined in this study. 
 
Closed-end funds sell units to investors only once, at the time of offer.  These funds 
do not issue additional units and may not redeem units on demand.  A lack of liquidity 
may prevent an investor from exiting this fund.  However, the effect of large capital 
inflows and outflows from contributors is minimal, giving managers some control 
over the assets under management.  A total of 55 closed-end funds is examined in this 
study. 
 
The non-surviving cohort includes funds that ceased operations over the observation 
period.  Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996) suggest that fund attrition is the result of 
either poor fund performance over a period of time or because the total market value 
of the fund is sufficiently small that the management judges that it no longer pays to 
maintain the fund.  The latter reason for closing a fund is associated the former 
reason: poor performance.  The exclusion of non-surviving funds therefore results in      
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an overestimation of historical returns
12.  Over the observation period 13 retail funds 
were terminated, and are included in the pool of funds considered in the analysis. 
 
Admati and Pfleiderer (1997) advocate the use of a benchmark proxy that reflects 
each fund’s investment strategy to augment the precision of performance evaluations.  
One of the advantages of the sample investigated in this study is that the asset 
allocation parameters are known.  To have membership in the category, funds are 
required to hold at least 80 percent of assets in a general portfolio of Australian 
equities, with a maximum of 20 percent in domestic fixed interest securities.  After an 
investigation of the fund mandates, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Top 100 
Accumulation index has been selected as the benchmark market proxy.  Given the 
large-capitalisation bias of managers, the ASX Top 20 Accumulation index is used as 
a confirmatory proxy.  If managers have engaged in some strategic behaviour over the 
observation period (for instance, attempting to exploit the size and/or value premium), 
the multi index model is designed to capture these affects.  The ability of active 
managers to generate alpha through superior macro forecasting abilities (for example, 
switching between equities and fixed interest), and/or the ability to exploit any 
deficiencies in the arbitrage function of markets through stock selection, will be 
captured by Equations (5) and (6). 
 
III.  Empirical Analysis 
 
Active fund managers engage in macro and/or micro forecasting to generate alpha.  
Alpha generation results in value being created for clients, with the manager 
garnering returns that exceed the cost of becoming informed.  Hence, the economics 
of active management require that the marginal benefit of active management 
exceeded its marginal costs.  Initial studies of manager performance focussed on the 
ability of managers to generate superior risk-adjusted returns through active stock 
selection.  The analysis of selectivity ability commences with the single index model 
of Equation (1). 
                                                            
12 For estimates of survivorship bias, see Grinblatt and Titman (1989), Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson 
and Ross (1992), and Brown and Goetzmann (1994).      




Cohort Single Index Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the average realised monthly percentage returns and coefficients, net of management 
expenses, from a pooled regression of excess returns against the single index model of the form: 
 
Rit – Rft = ai + bi (Rmt – Rft) + ei 
 
The adjusted R-squared and Durbin-Watson statistics are also reported.  The ASX Top 100 (Panel 
A) and ASX Top 20 (Panel B) Accumulation indices provide a proxy for benchmark returns.  The 
sample consists of 68 open-end funds, 55 closed-end funds, and 13 finalised funds (136 retail funds 
in total) for the period January 1991 through April 1999, a total of 100 trading months. 
Cohort  ai  Stand. Error  bi 
Stand. 
Error  R
2 adj  D-W 
Panel A: Rmt = ASX Top 100 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.16817 
(t = -0.95)  0.21363  0.87319 
(t = 19.73)  0.06061  0.78961  2.1776 
Retail closed-end  -0.16600 
(t = -1.38)  0.16091  0.79995 
(t = 22.77)  0.04638  0.72639  2.1815 
Retail non-surviving  -0.24824 
(t = -0.99)  0.33924  0.55988 
(t = 8.35)  0.08842  0.49093  2.1703 
All retail funds  - 0.17495 
(t = -1.13)  0.20408  0.81362 
(t =19.87)  0.05745  0.7389  2.1779 
Basis Points  
(per annum)  - 210           
Panel B: Rmt = ASX Top 20 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.25077 
(t = -1.08)  0.24999  0.80066 
(t = 13.24)  0.07463  0.71408  2.1086 
Retail closed-end  -0.21665 
(t = -1.39)  0.18507  0.73141 
(t = 15.78)  0.05354  0.66745  2.1197 
Retal non-surviving  -0.24279 
(t = -0.85)  0.35093  0.50762 
(t = 7.18)  0.08701  0.44012  2.1493 
All retail funds  -0.23621 




(t = 13.69)  0.06722  0.6759  2.1174 
Basis Points  
(per annum)  - 283           
 
Table I shows that the average manager underperformed by  -0.1749% per month, 
equivalent to –210 (-283) basis points p.a., using the broad ASX Top 100 (Top 20) 
Accumulation as the reference rate.  The negative result was evident across all 
cohorts, with the retail non-surviving category (as expected) providing the greatest 
level of alpha destruction.  However, the cohort alphas are all insignificant from zero 
at both the 5% and 10% levels.  The funds management industry was unable to predict 
security prices with sufficient accuracy to outperform a naive strategy per unit of 
systematic risk.  Therefore, alpha generation was not sufficient to recover 
management expenses. 
 
Table II provides estimates of the single-factor model on an individual fund basis.  Of 
the 136 funds, 109 (94) funds were characterised by alphas that were insignificant 
from zero against the Top 100 index at the 5% (10%) significance level.  In only 27 
(42) cases was there evidence of abnormal performance at the 5% (10%) level.  Out of      
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the significant cases, only 1 (1) fund had a significantly positive alpha while 26 (41) 




Individual Single Index Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the number of alphas that are insignificant (Zero), a nd significantly different from zero 
(Positive/Negative) from a single index model.  Also reported are the number of betas insignificant 
(Unity), significantly different from unity (Greater than unity/Less than unity). The results are 
considered at the 5% and 10% significance levels for both market proxies.  Finally, the mean alpha and 
beta terms for the sample are also shown.  
  Significance  a = Zero  a > Zero  a < Zero  Total  Mean a 
Panel A: Single Index Alphas for Individual Funds 
5 %  109  1  26  136  Top 100 
10 %  94  1  41  136 
-0.17 
5 %  110  0  26  136 
Top 20 
10 %  93  1  42  136 
-0.23 
  Significance  b = Unity  b >Unity  b < Unity  Total  Mean b 
Panel B: Single Index Betas for Individual Funds 
5 %  3  8  133  136  Top 100  10 %  1  8  135  136 
0.81 
5 %  3  6  133  136 
Top 20  10 %  1  6  135  136  0.74 
 
The evidence provided in Table II raises some important concerns regarding the 
overall level of systematic risk adopted by managers.  On an individual fund basis, 
only 3 funds reveal a beta estimate that is insignificant from unity at the 5% level.  
Only 8 funds exhibited beta estimates that were significantly greater than unity using 
the Top 100 index, with 6 funds demonstrating this characteristic against the Top 20 
index. 
 
Prior to drawing strong conclusions from the estimation of Equation (1), it is 
important to acknowledge the model has a number of limitations.  These include a 
heavy reliance on the ability for equity risk premium to capture fund return and Roll’s 
(1977, 1978) concerns regarding the observability of the market portfolio.  Recent 
advances in the asset pricing literature, led by Fama and French (1996), have allowed 
researchers to resolve some of these concerns.  Table III provides estimates of the 
multi index model of Equation (2). 
                                                            
13 However, the hypothesis that fund alphas are jointly equal to zero cannot be rejected at the 95% and 
90% confidence levels as more than half of the sample had alphas that were not significantly different 
from zero.      




Cohort Multi Index Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the average realised monthly percentage returns, from a pooled regression of excess 
percentage returns against the multi index model of the form: 
 
Rit – Rft = ai + bmt (Rmt – Rft) + bsi (Rst – Rlt) + bgi (Rgt – Rvt) + bdi (Rdt – Rft) + eI 
 
The intercept, a, is a measure of selectivity ability and the coefficients bs, bg, and bd represent the size, 
style and bond portfolios respectively. 
Cohort  ai  bi  bsi  bgi  bdi  R
2 adj  D-W 




(t = 0.11) 
0.85203 
(t = 19.62) 
0.17979 
(t = 2.57) 
0.07957 
(t = 1.04) 
0.32387 




(t = -0.63) 
0.79131 
(t = 23.43) 
0.13933 
(t = 2.68) 
-0.02903 
(t = -0.02) 
0.35698 




(t = -0.71) 
0.56949 
(t = 7.99) 
0.22297 
(t = 2.47) 
0.04483 
(t = 0.29) 
0.61133 
(t = 3.66)  0.62034  2.0439 
All retail funds  -0.03810 
(t = -0.29) 
0.80047 
(t = 20.06) 
0.16756 
(t = 2.61) 
0.03233 
(t = 0.54) 
0.36474 
(t = 3.14)  0.78828  2.2144 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  - 46             




(t = -0.11) 
0.83152 
(t = 15.68) 
0.33443 
(t = 3.76) 
0.03847 
(t = 0.55) 
0.31686 




(t = -0.68) 
0.77407 
(t = 19.56) 
0.27836 
(t = 4.38) 
-0.04212 
(t = -0.19) 
0.33079 




(t = -0.58) 
0.55813 
(t = 7.68) 
0.31253 
(t = 3.15) 
0.06729 
(t = 0.40) 
0.61173 
(t = 3.62)  0.60504  2.0487 
All retail funds  -0.06444 
(t = -0.39) 
0.78216 
(t = 16.49) 
0.30966 
(t = 3.96) 
0.00863 
(t = 0.24) 
0.35068 
(t = 2.55)  0.75922  2.2080 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  - 77             
 
The analysis presented in Table III provides corroborating evidence of the results 
from the single index model, with one notable exception.  As an industry, funds 
underperformed the market by a range of –46 (–77) basis points per annum, using the 
ASX Top 100 (Top 20) accumulation index as a proxy for passive returns.  However, 
unlike the previous analysis, all cohorts do not destroy value for investors.  Managers 
in the retail open-end category generated a positive alpha of around 34 basis points 
per annum (net of the cost of becoming informed) against the Top 100 index
14.  While 
this result is encouraging for those investors skilled enough (or lucky enough) to hold 
only surviving funds over the observation period, a complete discussion of 
performance requires acknowledgment of any survivorship bias.  Inclusion of 
terminated funds reverses this result, confirming that any analysis ignoring fund 
termination will dramatically overstate the industry’s stock selectivity skills.  Finally, 
all reported alpha estimates are insignificant from zero at both 5% and 10% levels, so 
the hypothesis that alpha is equal to zero cannot be rejected. 
                                                            
14 However, this result reverses when the ASX Top 20 Accumulation index is used as the market 
proxy, with the industry destroying around –30 basis points in value per annum.  This highlights, out of 
sample, the concerns of Lehmann and Modest (1987) regarding the issue of benchmark selection in 
performance evaluation.      
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Table IV 
Individual Multi Index Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the number of alphas that are insignificant (Zero), and significantly different from zero 
(Positive/Negative) from a multi index model.  Also reported are the number of betas insignificant 
(Unity), significantly different from unity (Greater than unity/Less than unity). The results are 
considered at the 5% and 10% significance levels for both market proxies.  Finally, the mean alpha 
and beta terms for the sample are also shown. 
  Significance  a = Zero  a > Zero  a < Zero  Total  Mean a 
Panel A: Multi Index Alphas for Individual Funds 
5 %  111  5  20  136  Top 100 
10 %  102  10  24  136 
-0.038 
5 %  117  3  16  136 
Top 20 
10 %  107  5  24  136 
-0.064 
  Significance  b = Unity  b >Unity  b < Unity  Total  Mean b 
Panel B: Multi Index Betas for Individual Funds 
5 %  3  10  133  136  Top 100  10 %  2  10  134  136 
0.80 
5 %  2  10  134  136 
Top 20  10 %  2  10  134  136  0.78 
 
Turning to the role of the explanatory variables in Equation (2), the average fund beta 
ranged from 0.78 to 0.80, implying that managers adopted a portfolio composition 
less risky than the general market.  These values are significant at both the 5% and 
10% levels under both market proxies.  The individual fund analysis indicated that 
133 (134) betas were significant at the 5% (10%) level against the Top 100 index.  To 
provide some guide to the range of systematic risk decisions made by managers, the 
highest beta recorded beta by any fund was 1.32 (Top 100 index), with the lowest 
estimated at 0.51. 
 
The size factor,  bsi, is positive and highly significant under both market proxies, 
ranging from 0.17 to 0.31.  The results provide some support to the notion that 
managers are attempting to exploit the size anomaly.  Moreover, the evidence 
highlights the limitations of using single index models of Equation (1) to analyse the 
cross-section of fund returns.  The regression coefficient relating to size was positive 
and significant for 88 (94) of the funds at the 5% (10%) level under the Top 100 
index. 
The style factor,  bgi, is positive but insignificant under both market proxies 
significance levels.  This is in contrast to the findings of Gruber (1996) who reported 
a significant negative coefficient for the style variable.  Only 39 (48) funds were 
statistically significant at the 5% (10%) level under the Top 100 index.  In further 
contrast to Gruber’s (1996) results from US mutual funds, 32 (33) were positive 
estimates.  This raises some important issues for superannuation investors regarding 
the consistency of the manager’s asset selection style (value or growth).  Moreover, 
research across a variety of international markets reports the existence of a ‘sweet 
spot’ for investors who hold small capitalisation stocks with a value bias
15.  Such 
opportunities appear to remain largely unexploited by the majority of managers 
investigated in this study. 
 
                                                            
15 This finding is confirmed by Fama and French (1996) for the US stock market, Halliwell, Heaney, 
and Sawicki (1999) for Australia, and Drew and Veeraraghavan (2001) for the emerging markets in 
Asia.      
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Turning to the final explanatory variable, the bond factor (bdi), plays an important role 
in capturing the return behaviour of managers.  Managers appear to be investing in a 
portfolio that has a significant holding of returns provided by less volatile, fixed 
interest securities.  Moving to the individual fund level, 98 (113) funds had significant 
coefficients at the 5% (10%) level under the Top 100 proxy.  Moreover, these 
estimates were all positive.  The relative importance of fixed interest returns in what 
are specialist, dedicated stock funds demonstrates the importance of considering the 
role market timing (or asset allocation) in the generation of alpha – an issue to which 
we now turn. 
 
Underlying the estimates from Equations (1) and (2) is the assumption that a funds’ 
systematic risk remains constant over time.  Relaxing this assumption, thereby 
decomposing the role of market timing from stock selection, requires regression 
models to take a non-linear form.  The evaluation of market timing commences with 
the augmented TM model of Equation (5).  The TM approach adds a quadratic term to 
Equation (1) in an attempt to incorporate the dynamism of a fund’s systematic risk. 
 
Table V 
TM Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the average realised monthly percentage returns, net of expenses, from a pooled 
regression of excess percentage returns against TM’s quadratic market model of the form: 
 
Rit – Rft = ai + bi (Rmt – Rft) + gi (Rmt – Rft) 
2 + eI 
 
The ASX Top 100 (Panel A) and ASX Top 20 (Panel B) accumulation indices are the proxy for 
benchmark returns.  The intercept term,  ai measures selectivity skill with the coefficient  gi 
measuring market timing ability. 
Cohort  ai  bi  gI  R
2  D-W 
Panel A: Rmt = ASX Top 100 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.16406 
(t = -0.95) 
0.86145 
(t = 19.97) 
-0.04916 
(t = -1.12)  0.78479  2.1545 
Retail closed-end  -0.16604 
(t = -1.40) 
0.79752 
(t = 24.62) 
-0.04239 




(t = -1.16) 
0.60908 
(t = 8.84) 
-0.11427 
(t = -1.16)  0.49264  2.1870 
All retail funds  -0.17884 
(t = -1.15) 
0.81147 
(t = 20.79) 
-0.05265 
(t = -1.22)  0.74000  2.1621 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  -215         
Panel B: Rmt = ASX Top 20 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.24361 
(t = -1.11) 
0.77429 
(t = 14.36) 
-0.12806 
(t = -2.30)  0.72806  2.0979 
Retail closed-end  -0.21950 
(t = -1.48) 
0.72647 
(t = 18.17) 
-0.10525 




(t = -1.05) 
0.54704 
(t = 7.78) 
-0.13714 
(t = -1.41)  0.4480  2.1659 
All retail funds  -0.24023 
(t = -1.26) 
0.73323 
(t = 15.27) 
-0.11970 
(t = -2.33)  0.68737  2.1122 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  -288         
 
The results reported in Table V further support the conclusion that on average, active 
managers have limited stock selection abilities, consistent with the findings of 
Hallahan and Faff (1999) for Australian unit trusts.  However, this is contrary to the      
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findings of accretive selection skills by Coggin, Fabozzi and Rahman (1993), Fletcher 
(1995) and Bello and Janjigian (1997) amongst others, and Sawicki and Ong (2000) 
for Australia.  The alpha coefficients reported in Table V using both market proxies 
are slightly greater compared to the coefficients obtained from the single-factor model 
shown in Table I, a result consistent with Grant’s (1977) contention that single index 
performance measures will have a downward bias if market timing effects are 
ignored.  A total of 28 (45) funds exhibited significant abnormal performance against 
the Top 100 index at the 5% (10%) level.  Of the funds with significant alphas, just 
one generated a positive alpha, with the remaining 27 managers recording negative 
performance.  With approximately three-quarters of the sample portraying no 
significant e vidence of selection ability (and those with a significant result 
demonstrating poor selectivity skills), the null hypothesis of no stock selection skill 
across the industry is not rejected. 
 
The beta estimates provided in Table V reinforce the finding that Australian 
superannuation funds took relatively low risks over the sample period.  However, the 
linear combination of an industry beta less than unity combined with negative 
selectivity estimates violates the received finding of a perverse relationship between 
timing and selectivity.  Specifically, this violates the widely cited findings of Black, 
Jensen, and Scholes (1972), and Kon and Jen (1978) who provide evidence that low-
risk portfolio compositions tend to result in positive selectivity performance estimates 
and vice versa
16.  Interestingly, over 90% of the funds that exhibited significant 
negative selectivity ability had systematic risk levels less than unity.  This raises the 
issue of whether the industry’s inferior performance was a result of generally poor 
micro forecasting ability by managers or some, as yet unidentified, features of 
portfolio composition. 
 
Equation (5) provides gamma estimates as a measure of market timing ability.  
Against both market proxies, all cohorts showed negative macro f orecasting skill.  
The problem of benchmark selection is again highlighted, with all results being 
insignificant at the 5% and 10% levels against the Top 100, but significant at the both 
levels for the Top 20 index.  Hence, it again appears that selection of the market proxy 
may significantly alter performance evaluation results.  However, some consensus is 
reached with the estimated regression coefficients from both proxies being negative, 
leading to a broad non-rejection of the null hypothesis
17. 
 
The evidence listed in Table V finds both support and controversy with previous 
studies examining the Australian market.  The findings are consistent with 
preliminary findings of perverse market timing by Sinclair (1990) and the recent 
contribution of Sawicki and Ong (2000).  However, the results do not reflect Hallahan 
and Faff’s results, of limited, mainly positive market timing skills of the managers of 
Australian unit trusts. 
                                                            
16 Moreover, Kon and Jen (1978) note that engaging in portfolio re-balancing (to maintain a target beta) 
will result in a transaction cost bias in favour of low beta portfolios. 
17 This poor performance is also evident where funds having the same selectivity and timing 
coefficients under TM generate an alpha of –0.255 (-0.247) at the 5% (10%) level under the Top 100 
index.      
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Individual fund gammas were significant in 31 (51) cases at the 5% (10%) level under 
the Top 100 proxy.  All of the estimated coefficients were significantly negative under 
both market proxies, equating to approximately 23% (38%) of the sample having 
significant perverse market timing abilities against Top 100 (Top 20).  The 
implication of this result is that around a quarter of managers tend to increase 
(decrease) their equity exposure as the market falls (rises).  In summary, we do not 
reject the null of hypothesis of no timing ability for the industry at both significance 
levels. 
 
Finally, it is important to comment on the nature of the relationship between timing 
and selectivity.  Against, the Top 100 index, there is a negative, but very low 
correlation found between the two coefficients, with a reported value –0.232
18.  The 
Top 20 index corroborates this result, with an estimated value of –0.069.  These low 
values would support Lehman and Modest’s (1987) finding of ‘no substantive’ 
correlation.  This is in contrast to a large body of research reporting a large negative 
correlation between timing and selectivity (Henrickson 1984, Chang and Lewellen 
1984, Connor and Korajcyzk 1991, Fletcher 1995, and Bello and Janjigian 1997).  
These results are also in contrast to previous Australian studies of Sinclair (1990), 
Hallahan and Faff (1999) and  Sawicki and Ong (2000).  Therefore, given these 
controversial findings, we turn to an alternative market-timing model, the HM model 
to further investigate the validity of the results. 
                                                            
18 This is significant at the 5% and 10% levels with a t-statistic of –2.760.      
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Table VI 
HM Performance Estimates 
 
Listed are the average realised monthly percentage returns, net of expenses, from a pooled 
regression of excess percentage returns against HM’s dual-beta model of the form: 
 
Rit – Rft = ai + b1i (Rmt – Rft) + b2iD (Rmt – Rft) + eI 
 
The ASX Top 100 (Panel A) and ASX Top 20 (Panel B) accumulation indices are the proxy for 
benchmark returns.  The intercept term, ai is a measure of selectivity ability, and the coefficients b1i, 
and (b1i - b2i) represent the up and down-market betas respectively.  A successful market timer will 
have a down-market beta greater than the up-market beta.  Therefore, b2i should be significantly 
positive for a successful market timer. 
Cohort  ai  b1i  b2I  R
2  D-W 
Panel A: Rmt = ASX Top 100 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.17340 
(t = -0.98) 
0.86823 
(t = 19.85) 
-0.03620 




(t = -1.40) 
0.79851 
(t = 23.97) 
-0.03115 




(t = -1.01) 
0.58139 
(t = 8.94) 
-0.06706 
(t = -0.88)  0.48959  2.2077 
All retail funds  -0.18086 
(t = -1.51) 
0.81262 
(t = 20.48) 
-0.03710 
(t = -0.82)  0.73863  2.1736 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  -217         
Panel B: Rmt = ASX Top 20 accumulation index 
Retail open-end  -0.26753 
(t = -1.18) 
0.78369 
(t = 14.28) 
-0.12343 




(t = -1.49) 
0.72813 
(t = 17.67) 
-0.09485 




(t = -0.94) 
0.53557 
(t = 7.79) 
-0.11158 
(t = -1.25)  0.44525  2.1860 
All retail funds  -0.25190 
(t = -1.28) 
0.73750 
(t = 15.03) 
-0.11074 
(t = -2.04)  0.68509  2.1092 
Basis Points 
(per annum)  -302         
 
Similar to the results reported earlier in this study, the returns are largely negative but 
insignificant from zero at the 5% and 10% levels.  Again, one fund generated a 
significant positive alpha for investors (the same fund found using the TM technique) 
with 28 funds having significant estimates under the Top 100 index.  As with all of 
the tests undertaken in this study, we do not reject the null hypothesis of no selectivity 
ability.  The trend of managers having a relatively low risk appetite is confirmed 
using Equation (6).  A total of 7 (6) funds had beta coefficients significantly greater 
than unity against the Top 100 (Top 20), at both the 5% and 10% levels.  This small 
group of relatively high-risk funds has remained the same for all of the models 
estimated. 
 
The beta 2 results from Equation (6) provide a measure of market timing ability.  
Successful market timing by the manager results in positive beta 2 coefficient being 
significantly different from zero.  As an industry, the estimates corroborate the result 
of no timing ability using both market proxies.  Moving to an individual fund 
analysis, 8 (26) funds showed significant timing skill at the 5% (10%) level using the      
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Top 100 index
19.  Finally, the HM measure confirms a marginal negative relationship 
between macro and micro forecasting ability, with a correlation of –0.252
20 using the 
Top 100, and  –0.086 against the Top 20 index.  The international and domestic 
phenomenon of significant but perverse market timing decisions, typically offset by 
significant accretive stock selection skill, is not supported in this study.  This study 
provides little evidence that the Australian funds management industry has sufficient 
macro and/or micro forecasting abilities to generate positive alpha for superannuation 
investors. 
 
IV.  Concluding Remarks 
 
The performance evaluation literature has long debated the relationship between 
macro and micro forecasting skill.  While the evidence has largely found that inferior 
market timing decisions are compensated for by superior stock selection skills, the 
recent contribution by Hallahan and Faff (1999) reported contrary behaviour for 
Australia.  However, regardless of whether timing skills are positive or negative, 
previous studies have reported the existence of a significant negative relationship with 
a manager’s selection ability.  The consensus view posits a situation where managers 
face a trade-off between timing and selectivity when generating alpha. 
 
As Australia moves towards a full choice regime in superannuation, permitting 
investors to move superannuation savings with freedom among different investment 
alternatives, the findings of this study question the ability for the funds management 
industry to create value for constituents through alpha generation.  Moreover, the 
findings of limited macro or micro forecasting skill question the ongoing role of 
dedicated, single-sector funds (such as the actively managed Australian equity funds 
investigated in this study) in the transformation of retirement savings into retirement 
income.  One legitimate economic function for such intermediaries would be to 
provide a diversification facility for unit-holders, in this case, superannuation 
contributors. 
 
The study has been unsuccessful in unifying the literature regarding the timing and 
selectivity performance of the Australian funds management industry by Sinclair 
(1990), Hallahann and Faff (1999) and Sawicki and Ong (2000).  This previous 
research has debated the nature of the timing/selectivity trade-off, but all conclude 
that the relationship is a negative one.  This study, as with the work of Lehman and 
Modest (1987), found that no substantive inverse relationship exists between timing 
and selectivity.  The evidence suggests that managers did not try to significantly alter 
their systematic risk levels, resulting in largely fixed coefficients over the sample 
period.  This Australian evidence is consistent with Fabozzi and Francis’s (1979) 
observation that managers in the US do not try to alter their systematic risk to exploit 
market movements.  Possible reasons offered as to why this phenomenon occurs 
include the manager’s inability to time market movements and/or costs of such timing 
being prohibitive. 
 
                                                            
19 This poor performance is also evident where the number of funds having the same selectivity and 
timing coefficients under HM generate an alpha of –0.209 (-0.227) at the 5% (10%) level under the 
Top 100 proxy. 
20 This is significant at the 5% and 10% levels with a t-statistic of –3.009.      
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Two issues lead the agenda for future research on the role of timing and selectivity in 
the generation of alpha.  The first area of concern relates to the definition of style for 
Australian superannuation fund managers.  An investigation into the style of asset 
selection decisions made by the Australian funds management industry is required to 
permit a deeper understanding of alpha that is consumed by poor selectivity.  A 
fruitful area of research may relate to the issue of style drift over the observation 
period.  Second, future research may consider the incorporation of multi index models 
with traditional selectivity and timing technology, in a conditional setting, to further 
decompose alpha generation by managers.  This is an issue we will explore in our 
next paper. 
      




Listed are the diagnostic tests for each model used in the study. Durbin Watson and Jarque Bera test 
statistics (and probability values) are reported.  The data set employed is largely clean, as the 
diagnostic tests reveal that the models employed do not suffer from any of the common ailments of 
first-order serial correlation, or non-normality of the residuals.  All results have used White’s (1980) 























(p = 0.45) 
13.24 
(p = 0.33) 
25.45 
(p = 0.42) 
10.86 
(p = 0.43) 
15.27 
(p = 0.44) 
13.62 
(p = 0.34) 
14.61 
(p = 0.43) 
12.05 




Tests for Multicollinearity 
 
Listed are the diagnostic checks for multicollinearity for the market timing models, TM and HM.  The 
results demonstrate that the R
2 values (and the corresponding F-statistic) for the auxiliary regressions 
estimated on the variables suspected to cause multicollinearity.  The probability values given are less 
than the significance levels at the 5% and 10% level, resulting in a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
no multicollinearity. 
Model  Market Proxy  Variable  R
2  F-stat 
(p-value) 
Top 100  gi Rmt
2  0.13  7.37 
(p = 0.00)  Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) 
Top 20  gi Rmt
2  0.06  3.11 
(p = 0.00) 
Top 100  b2iDRmt  0.69  110.81 
(p = 0.00)  Henrickson and 
Merton (1981)  Top 20  b2iDRmt  0.72  128.37 
(p = 0.00) 
 
Appendix III 
Additional Tests for Multicollinearity 
 
Listed are additional diagnostic checks for multicollinearity for the two market timing models. It shows 
regression estimates for the variables responsible for the collinearity problem.  This is achieved by: 
first, regressing these variables alone against the original dependent variable, excess fund returns; and, 
second regressing them with the other explanatory variable against excess fund returns.  






Top 100  gi Rmt
2  -0.0705 
(t = -3.79) 
-0.0106 
(t = -1.22)  Treynor and 
Mazuy (1966) 
Top 20  gi Rmt
2  -0.0659 
(t = -2.58) 
-0.0234 
(t = -2.33) 
Top 100  b2iDRmt 
1.2885 
(t = 8.39) 
-0.1244 
(t = -0.82)  Henrickson and 
Merton (1981)  Top 20  b2iDRmt 
1.0834 
(t = 7.58) 
-0.3551 
(t = -2.04) 
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